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In recent years, there have been increasing numbers of alerts
for possible imported human cases infected with highly
pathogenic viruses (HiPaVs). Striking examples include severe
respiratory pathogens (e.g. the SARS or MERS coronavirus) [1]
and haemorrhagic fever viruses (e.g. Ebola virus) [2]. Many
countries have already implemented disease control measures
that include the establishment of specialized facilities such as
negative-air-pressure isolation rooms for the containment of
patients, and reference diagnostic laboratories in which
potentially infectious samples can be safely analysed to provide
diagnosis and virus characterization. Additionally, protocols
have been established for the transportation, reception and
management of patients, and the corresponding shipment of
biological samples to specialized reference laboratories.
Clearly, the implementation and coordination of these
health control measures is complex and expensive. However,
importantly, their efﬁcacy in detecting HiPaV patients and
providing them with the best medical management remains
unproven.
Detection of Cases
The ﬁrst objective is to detect and isolate patients infected
with HiPaV as rapidly as possible, to reduce the likelihood of
human-to-human transmission. Accordingly, as viral infections
produce a wide range of clinical presentations [3–5], detection
should not be performed only in cases that meet the criteria
for severe infection (e.g. haemorrhagic fever), but should
rather be extended to febrile syndromes occurring in patients
returning from an epidemic area. This has practical implications
in terms of the capacity to provide a clinical diagnosis rapidly,
for a potentially signiﬁcant number of patients, and this issue is
discussed further below.
Clinical Management
Previous experience has proven that some suspected cases
were actually suffering from treatable infectious diseases, such
as bacterial or herpes virus infections, or malaria. Thus, the
management of cases possibly infected with an HiPaV should
not reduce the efﬁciency of identifying these patients with
speciﬁc treatable infections [6]. However, in the vast majority
of cases, the medical team cannot gain access to classic
biological investigations until the reference laboratory has
excluded HiPaV infection. Therefore, the patient may spend a
signiﬁcant period of time without access to basic biological
investigations that should guide aetiological treatment or
intensive-care management. In some cases, this may represent
a loss of opportunity to save the lives of patients.
When little information is available at the arrival of patients,
samples may be sent to hospital laboratories, e.g. for blood
counts, biochemistry tests, and/or malaria diagnosis, before the
severity of the case is recognized. Paradoxically, this may be
beneﬁcial for initial patient management, but obviously repre-
sents an unacceptable risk of dissemination when there is an
actual HiPaV infection. Possible ways of alleviating these
problems are discussed below.
Contribution of Hospital and Reference
Laboratories
The ultimate objective must be to be able to distinguish the
few potential HiPaV patients from the majority of patients with
treatable infections within hours of patient arrival and
hospitalization, allowing both the majority of the latter to be
reintegrated into standard healthcare pathways and HiPaV
patients to be managed in optimal conditions.
This implies that hospital laboratories should whenever
possible, perform the ﬁrst-line tests for detection of HiPaV
infections. This is possible in most cases, when the diagnosis
relies on real-time PCR or RT-PCR detection of the viral
genome in biological samples, because such tests are easy to
standardize and highly reproducible (and many already exist in
the form of commercial kits) [7–9]. Moreover, hospital labora-
tories, most often, already have considerable experience in using
them. This, however, raises considerable biosecurity issues. The
introduction of dedicated, biologically safe sampling techniques
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that automatically inactivate the sample at the patient’s bedside
would be of great value in this context, and their development
should be encouraged and actively supported by health
authorities. This would greatly increase the speed of the
diagnostic process, as patients with a suspicion of HiPaV
infection could be safely tested by the use of standard laboratory
and sample transportation protocols.
The transfer of ﬁrst-line diagnosis to a number of qualiﬁed
hospital laboratories represents, in the medium term, a
strategic reorientation similar to that implemented previously
for a number of pathogens, including inﬂuenza virus. It is not
expected to modify, in depth, the prerogatives of national
reference laboratories. They will remain key for establishing
and validating standard operation procedures for this ﬁrst-line
diagnosis, organizing external quality assessment programmes,
and performing all additional investigations, such as genetic
characterization, virus isolation, serological testing, and col-
lection and interpretation of epidemiological information. The
national reference laboratories would also be able to help in
developing innovative sampling and inactivation procedures
that could make the diagnostic process in hospitals safer and
faster.
Conclusion
Here, we have brieﬂy considered: (i) the currently increasing
number of alerts for HiPaV cases imported into non-epidemic
regions of the world; (ii) the possibility that future episodes may
involve larger numbers of patients and the requirement for
detecting all forms of infection, whatever the clinical presenta-
tion, to break the potential chains of transmission [10]; and (iii)
the current time delay in reintegrating patients into standard
healthcare pathways. Accordingly, we advocate that the infra-
structural and logistic reorganization proposed here could be
crucial for the future improved implementation of the clinical
management of patients potentially infected with HiPAVs.
Urgent actions are required to be prepared to keep the problem
under control in case of a health crisis of larger magnitude.
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